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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence based systems may be used as digital nudging techniques
that can steer or coerce users to make decisions not always aligned with their true
interests. When such systems properly address the issues of Fairness, Account-
ability, Transparency, and Ethics, then the trust of the user in the system would just
depend on the system’s output.
The aim of this paper is to propose a model for exploring how good and bad
recommendations affect the overall trust in an idealized recommender system that
issues recommendations over a resource with limited capacity. The impact of dif-
ferent users attitudes on trust dynamics is also considered.
Using simulations, we ran a large set of experiments that allowed to observe
that: 1) under certain circumstances, all the users ended accepting the recommen-
dations; and 2) the user attitude (controlled by a single parameter balancing the
gain/loss of trust after a good/bad recommendation) has a great impact in the trust
dynamics.
1 Introduction
Decision making is an ubiquitous task that is not done in vacuum. Our decisions are
constrained by our own preferences, by our social network, by the context, by the envi-
ronment and so on. Moreover, we are surrounded by little nudges: indirect suggestions
that are generated by some external agent to influence the decision making process of
groups or individuals [13].
An example are the so called “Dark Patterns” defined as “user interface design
choices that benefit an online service by coercing, steering, or deceiving users into mak-
ing unintended and potentially harmful decisions” [10]. In such paper, authors make
recommendations to study, mitigate, and minimize the use of these patterns. These and
other nudging techniques are gaining attention in the last years [15, 12]
But these nudges can be issued by more sophisticated systems which through the
use of proper data collection, modeling and learning are able to exploit our “history”
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and preferences trying to induce us taking some decisions. In what follows, we will
refer to these systems as ADM: Automated Decision Making systems .
Nowadays, there is an increasing concern on how such ADM are designed and
deployed and several countries, research centers and institutions are devoting efforts
on how to best address this concern. As relevant examples we can cite
As relevant examples we can cite a white paper (written by Informatics Europe
and the ACM Europe Policy Committee), presenting specific recommendations from
the European technical and scientific community about how policy makers, legislators,
and concerned individuals might best respond to the rapid growth of ADM [9]. We
can also mention the European approach to Artificial Intelligence, where there is a
High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI-HLEG)[4] that recently (June
2019) presented their Policy and Investment Recommendations for Trustworthy AI
[5] during the first European AI Alliance Assembly1. Besides these initiatives, the
interested reader may find in [6], a summary of 26 strategies for A.I. from different
countries worldwide.
Overall, many of the principles, recommendations and guidelines can be summa-
rized in four key issues: Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics.
If we focus on the people using those ADM, the concept of “trust” emerges as one
of the most relevant ones. The European Policy mentioned before makes clear that
trust is a prerequisite to ensure a human-centric approach to AI and identify seven key
requirements that AI applications should respect to be considered trustworthy.
Why a user should trust the output (a decision, a recommendation) of such ADM?
how good/bad decisions/recommendations affect the level of trust on the behavior of
the system? How aspects like data collection, privacy management, strategic manipu-
lation, nudging and so on affect trust? These are all relevant questions.
In this context, one may argue that as the ADM start to behave following the key
issues mentioned above, the trust of the people in the system will be only affected
by the system’s output, as other aspects (like privacy management) will be properly
managed by some external certification authority.
It is well known that defining trust is far from trivial as different disciplines define
it differently. Here, and considering the so called recommender systems [7, 14, 8] as
a particular case of an ADM, we define trust as the willingness of the user to accept
a recommendation based on a subjective belief that the recommender tool will exhibit
reliable behavior to maximize the users interest under uncertainty of a given situation,
based on past experiences with the tool. Our definition resembles the one presented in
[3].
Thus, the aim of this paper is to study the dynamics of trust on an multi-user sce-
nario with an ideal recommender system. We depart from a fair and unbiased idealized
recommendation tool which issues binary suggestions on using or not a resource with
limited capacity. Typical examples are take/do not take a given route, go/do not go
to a restaurant or a bar, and so on. The use of a limited capacity resource forces the
use of different recommendations even for users with the same profile. Consider, for
example, route navigation apps. If all the drivers are recommended an alternative route
1https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/
first-european-ai-alliance-assembly
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to avoid a traffic jam ahead, then, the alternative route will be also congested within
a short period of time and can generate disturbances in the neighborhoods where the
traffic was diverted. So, it becomes clear that not all the users should receive the same
recommendation (this is an aspect related with “fairness”).
In our model, users simultaneously receive a recommendation on going or not going
to a bar. The users decide at the same time whether they will go to the bar or not. As
the bar has a limited capacity, it’s no fun to go there if it is too crowded. Every user has
a level of trust on the recommender that is increased/decreased if the recommendation
was good or not. The amount of increase/decrease in the level of trust is the key to
model different user attitudes2.
We will explore how good/bad recommendations may affect the trust in the recom-
mender, considering different users attitude towards recommendation errors: tolerant,
neutral or intolerant (in a continuum and not as discrete categories). In situations of re-
peated interactions, we will analyze how the overall trust in the recommender evolves
and how the users attitude significantly affects the results.
Using simulations, experiments will be done and conclusions will be outlined.
Consequently, the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the components and
the inner working of proposed model is described. Then, in Section 3 the main experi-
ments and results are described and analyzed. They are related with a) the evolution of
trust in the recommendations, and b) the influence of the user attitude on trust dynam-
ics. Finally, Section 4 is devoted to conclusions and further work.
2 Model Description
The proposed model is based on three components: a resource, the users and the rec-
ommender. These components are described below and then, the interactions among
them is presented.
a) The Resource
We depart from a resource with a limited capacity (let’s suppose a bar) C and a “com-
fort level” L (as in the El Farol problem [1]) which is the maximum number of users
that makes the place not crowded. We assume that a number N > L of users exist (not
all the users can simultaneously go to the bar).
The attendance Ot is the number of users that decided to go to the bar at time t.
b) Users
We have a set of homogeneous users A = {a1, a2, . . . , aN}, where every ai has:
• αti ∈ [0, 1]: level of trust on the recommendation at time t.
2 This model resembles the “El Farol” bar problem [1], a typical example of the so called Minority Games
[2]. Here, we eliminate some assumptions like the existence of payoffs (in terms of game theory), a history
of bar attendances and the use of several prediction strategies by the users. In turn, all the users employ the
same trust based decision rule, while the recommender system (not present in the original problem) uses a
very simple recommendation strategy.
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Figure 1: Top: Graphical representation of the model. Bottom: Example showing five
iterations of the model with N = 5 users and L = 3. Recommendation, decision and
level of trust for every user are shown. Also the attendance Ot and the average trust α¯t
are displayed in the last two columns.
• recomti, decti ∈ {GO,STAY }: recommendation received and the decision taken
at time t, respectively.
Decision Rule: the user will accept the recommendation (decti = recomti) with a value
proportional to αti. If the user rejects the recommendation, it will do the other action.
Notice that when αti = 1, the user will always accept the recommendation, but
when αti = 0, it will do the opposite of the recommendation.
Trust Revision Protocol: every user has a protocol to modify its level of trust αt+1i in
the recommender in terms of the last recommendation received ( recomti) and the last
attendance to the bar (Ot).
The users have two parameters β, γ called the positive and negative feedback (or
learning factor) respectively. In this initial setting, all users are considered homoge-
neous (they share the same decision rule and the trust revision protocol).
The trust will increase, making αt+1i = α
t
i + β if the recommendation was “good”.
This will happen either when:
1. the tool recommended to GO and the bar was not crowded (recomti = GO and
Ot ≤ L), or
2. the tool recommended to STAY and the bar was crowded (recomti = STAY
and Ot > L)
In turn, the trust will decrease, making αt+1i = α
t
i − γ if the recommendation was
“bad”. Either when:
1. the tool recommended to GO and the bar was crowded (recomti = GO and
Ot > L), or
2. the tool recommended to STAY and the bar was not crowded (recomti = STAY
and Ot ≤ L)
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The use of different values for β, γ has two reasons: 1) trust can be gained or lost
at different rates, 2) the relation between both parameters allows to represent different
user attitudes, leading to:
• Neutral User: γ = β, the same feedback is added/substracted to the current level
of trust.
• Tolerant User: γ < β, the loose of trust occurs slower than trust gain: which
means that the agent is tolerant to recommendation errors.
• Intolerant User: γ > β: the agent penalizes the recommendation errors. For
example, when γ = 2 × β then an error in the recommendation has two times
more impact in the level of trust than a good recommendation. In other words,
after a bad recommendation, the user will need two good ones to recover the
original level of trust.
c) The Recommender
The recommender knows the set of users but does not have access to their internal
levels of trust (the αti values). Just the last decision taken by every user ai (the value
decti) is available to the recommender.
Given that the users are homogeneous, a profile based recommendation would not
be possible (remember that the bar has a limited capacity). So, as a starting point, the
recommender uses a very simple rule for the assignment of recommendations:
• randomly select a set G of L users.
• every user ai ∈ G receives a GO recommendation
• every user ai /∈ G receives a STAY recommendation
This recommender would be an ideal one from the user perspective: it has no room
for manipulation, its behavior is clearly unbiased, it does not have access to the user’s
private information, it does not store any users’ historical data and so on.
Working scheme
The elements of the model are depicted in Fig. 1 (top).
At every time step t, there are three stages.
1. Recommendation Stage: the recommender sends a recommendation recti to ev-
ery user ai.
2. Decision Stage: using the decision rule described previously, every user takes a
decision decti. As expected, the recommendation can be followed or not.
3. Update Statistics Stage: taking into account the users decisions, some measures
are calculated (see below) and informed to the users. Then they adapt their levels
of trust using the revision protocol described previously.
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At every time step t the following measures are calculated.
• Attendance Ot: number of users that decided to go to the bar.
• Average trust on the recommendations:
α¯t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
αti
Please note that the value α¯t is just informative and does not affect neither the
decision of the users, nor the way recommendations are issued.
Let’s suppose N = 5, L = 3, β = γ = 0.05 (neutral users). An example with
five iterations is displayed in Fig. 1 (bottom). For each user, three values are shown:
(reci, deci) αi. We use the value ‘G’ in recti or dec
t
i to denote a GO recommendation
or decision while ‘S’ states a STAY one. Then, the attendance Ot and the average trust
α¯t appear.
Consider user a1 when t = 1 (first row). The recommendation was GO but the user
decided to STAY. As the bar was not crowded (Ot = 2), the recommendation was good
so the level of trust of a1 is increased. In turn, consider user a3. The recommendation
was STAY but the user decided to GO. As the bar was not crowded (Ot = 2), the
recommendation was bad. Trust should be decreased but as it could not be lower than
zero, it stays in the minimum possible value.
We can also consider the dynamic behavior of every user. If we focus on user a5,
we observe that for t = 1, 2, 3, it received a GO recommendation that the user does not
follow. In those time steps, the bar was not crowded, so the level of trust of the user
was increased. When t = 4, the recommendation was STAY but it decided to GO. The
bar was not crowded, so the trust was reduced. A similar analysis can be done for the
rest of users.
In this example, the average trust increased in every iteration.
It is important to remark that as the recommender has no access to the (private) level
of trust of the users, it can not broadcast any sort of average trust to them. Neither is
possible the communication among the users. Both aspects, although important, would
add additional features to the model that may affect the analysis of the trust dynamics.
3 Experiments
Two experiments are conducted. The first one is aimed at understanding trust dynamics
(how the average trust change with the time), while the second one focuses on how trust
dynamics is affected by the user attitudes with respect to recommendation errors.
3.1 The evolution of the average level of trust
This experiment is aimed to understand how the trust changes with the time. Some
preliminary experiments showed us that the average level of trust converge to 1, so
here we pose the following questions:
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N L runs I2C stdDev
20 12 100 64.61 8.08
40 24 100 78.29 10.04
60 36 100 88.96 11.89
80 48 100 95.00 12.68
100 60 100 101.03 13.60
200 120 100 123.85 19.50
300 180 100 138.81 19.05
400 240 100 159.41 20.07
500 300 100 164.58 26.72
600 360 100 181.74 30.34
700 420 100 188.29 32.58
800 480 100 192.70 27.86
900 540 100 198.71 33.95
1000 600 100 208.01 39.90
Table 1: Results from 100 repetitions for different number of users. All the repetitions
converged. The average number of iterations to convergence (I2C) and the correspond-
ing standard deviation are shown in the last two columns.
1. Is there any t∗ which makes the individual values αt
∗
i , ∀ i ∈ [1 . . . N ] converge?.
2. In such a case, the convergence value is the same for all the users?.
3. Does the number of users has any implications on the results?
For different values of N , L = 0.6×N , and γ = β = 0.05 and a maximum of 250
iterations, we run 100 independent repetitions of the simulation.
Results are shown in Table 1, where for each value of N , the number of repeti-
tions that converged (runs), out of 100, and the average number of iterations done to
converge (I2C) are displayed.
The first element to highlight is that all the repetitions converged, and the average
level of trust reached the value 1. In other words, always ∃ t∗ |αt∗i = 1, ∀i ∈ [1 . . . N ],
where t∗ is the time (or iterations) to convergence. This is extremely relevant because
when such situation occurs, all the users will accept the recommendation, which means
that (from the point of view of the recommender and the resource usage) the problem
became an assignment problem instead of a recommendation one.
Another point to analyze is the relation between the number of users N and the
average number of iterations to converge I2C. The plot in Fig. 2 shows this relation,
which perfectly adjusts to a power law with y = 25.586x0.3021, R2 = 0.9977.
3.2 On the influence of users’ attitude
Now, in this experiment, we explore how the trust dynamics change in terms of the
users attitude. The question we posed here is: Does the user attitude (the relation
between γ and β) has any impact in the time to convergence?.
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Figure 2: Average iterations to converge in terms of the number of users
Recall that a good recommendation makes αt+1i = α
t
i +β; otherwise trust changes
as αt+1i = α
t
i − γ.
We fix N = 100, L = 60. We keep β = 0.05 and we define γ as φ × β with
φ = {0.5, 0.6, . . . 1.8, 1.9, 2.0}
The φ value allows to model the user attitude as a continuum between tolerant to
intolerant attitude. When φ = 1, then a neutral user is modeled while φ < 1 allows
to model a tolerant one. Finally, when φ > 1 an intolerant user is obtained. For each
value of φ we run 100 repetitions of the simulation, each one with a maximum of 5000
iterations.
The results are shown in Table 2. Focusing first in the left part of the Table, two
different behaviors are clearly observed. The first one is when φ ≤ 1.4, where all
the runs converged. In these cases, a clear exponential relation is observed between φ
(γ) and the time to converge. When the negative feedback is lower than the positive
one γ < β (i.e. φ < 1) the time to converge is shorter than when γ = β (φ =
1). These would be the behavior of “tolerant” users that forgive the recommendation
errors. When 1 < φ ≤ 1.4 we are in the presence of users that are less tolerant
to recommendation errors. The higher the γ (the negative feedback), the harder the
convergence.
When φ = 1.5 an important change in the behavior of the model appeared. Just
60 % of the runs converged while such percentage reduced to just 3% when φ = 1.6 .
Moreover, when φ > 1.6, the simulations did not converge within the iterations limits
posed.
To better understand the changes between 1.4 ≤ φ ≤ 1.6, we made another exper-
iment with fine grained values for φ = {1.4, 1.41, 1.42, . . . 1.59, 1.6}. The results are
shown in Table 2 (right). The simulation converged in all the runs when φ ≤ 1.46. For
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φ γ runs I2C
0.5 0.025 100 52
0.6 0.030 100 58
0.7 0.035 100 65
0.8 0.040 100 73
0.9 0.045 100 86
1.0 0.050 100 100
1.1 0.055 100 127
1.2 0.060 100 162
1.3 0.065 100 238
1.4 0.070 100 544
1.5 0.075 60 2205
1.6 0.080 3 4557
1.7 0.085 0 -
1.8 0.090 0 -
1.9 0.095 0 -
2.0 0.100 0 -
φ γ I2C
1.40 0.0700 100 544
1.41 0.0705 100 604
1.42 0.0710 100 722
1.43 0.0715 100 910
1.44 0.0720 100 1091
1.45 0.0725 100 1292
1.46 0.0730 100 1378
1.47 0.0735 94 1554
1.48 0.0740 85 2043
1.49 0.0745 86 2065
1.50 0.0750 60 2205
1.51 0.0755 54 2494
1.52 0.0760 34 2324
1.53 0.0765 26 1999
1.54 0.0770 30 2537
1.55 0.0775 22 2206
1.56 0.0780 13 2171
1.57 0.0785 11 3347
1.58 0.0790 4 1028
1.59 0.0795 7 2481
1.60 0.080 3 4557
Table 2: Influence of φ in the average time to convergence. Values for I2C are rounded.
higher φ values, the number of converged runs reduces following a cuadratic relation
(y = 4226.7x2 − 13689x + 11084 ,R2 = 0.973) (see Fig. 3). Please note that these
changes in φ values imply just a modification of γ at the fourth decimal place.
These results raise another question: when a simulation does not converge, which
is the average level of trust reached?
Figure 4 shows boxplots corresponding to the average trust values achieved for
φ ≥ 1.6. It is clear that as the negative feedback increases (the users are more intolerant
to recommendation errors), it becomes harder to the average trust to increase. In fact,
such value never gets higher than 0.4. Recall that when φ = 2, then a recommendation
error has two times more impact in the trust than a good recommendation. The plot
shows that in this case, the average trust is almost always below than 0.3 which in turn
means that 7 out of 10 recommendations (70%) are rejected by the users.
4 Conclusions
We focused in an idealized recommender tool that issues binary recommendations over
using or not a resource with limited capacity.
We proposed a simple model to study both: 1) the evolution of trust and 2) the
impact of users attitude on the trust dynamics.
We focused on two research questions for which, the main conclusions are outlined.
1) Is there any t∗ which makes the individual confidences αt
∗
i , ∀ i ∈ [1 . . . N ] con-
verge?. In such a case, the convergence value is the same for all the users?.
The experiments confirmed that the answer to this question is YES. Using neutral
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Figure 3: Number of repetitions that converged in terms of φ
Figure 4: Average trust after 5000 iterations for different values of φ (Recall γ = φ×β)
10
users (the same positive and negative learning factors β = γ = 0.05), all the simula-
tions ended with all the users having αi = 1. In other words, at some point in time, all
the users accept the recommendation. It was also observed that the value t∗ (the time
to convergence) follows a power law relation with the number of users.
From the point of view of the resource usage, this is very important: if the users
accept the recommendation, then the recommender can properly balance the attendance
to bar. Moreover, the recommendation problem can be transformed onto an assignment
problem and then a more “fair” approach for recommendations can be implemented
(instead of a random one).
2) Does the user attitude (the relation between γ and β) has any impact in the time to
convergence?.
The answer is YES. The relation between both parameters has a very strong impact
in the time (or number of iterations) to converge. Recall that each time the recom-
mender produced a good recommendation, the user’s trust is increased in β units, while
it is decreased by γ if the recommendation was bad. When β > γ, users are tolerant to
recommendation errors. A good recommendation weights more than an error. Under
this configuration, the simulation always converged. As the difference γ − β became
bigger, the number of simulations that converged reduced following a quadratic rela-
tion. This is related with the fact that the average trust on the recommendation stayed
in low values (below 0.4).
Another important observation is how sensitive is this simple model with respect
to small variations in γ. With γ = 0.07, all the simulations converged, while using
γ = 0.085 none of them did.
This “sensitivity to initial conditions” is a very well known situation in the complex
systems field [11].
If using this simple model, such variations are observed, then one should be very
careful when analyzing more complex ones, as very small variations may lead to very
big changes in the system behavior.
Overall, we consider this model and the results obtained as first step towards un-
derstanding the impact of trust dynamics in recommendation tools for resources with
limited capacity.
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